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PART II: STUDENT COMMENT: USE OF THE
SUMMONS, INTERVENTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
USE OF THE SUMMONS

The investigative authority of the Internal Revenue Service
(hereinafter I.R.S.) derives from section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.16 Under that section, the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate is authorized to examine books, papers,
records and other data, and to take testimony for the purpose of
"ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the
liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . ., or collecting any such liability. 11 7 The Secretary or his delegate is further authorized under section 7602
To summon the person liable for tax . . .or any person

having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax
. . .or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem
proper, to appear . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry . . ..

Section 7602 does not, however, provide the I.R.S. with the
power to enforce its own summonses. In order for the I.R.S. to
compel compliance with a summons, it must bring an enforce16. 26 U.S.C. §7602:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or

fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any
such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform
the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
17. 26 U.S.C. §7602.
18. 26 U.S.C. §7602.
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ment proceeding in a federal district court. Jurisdiction of the
district courts to entertain such suits is established under section
7604 (a) of the Internal Revenue code of 1954.19 In addition section
7604(b) provides for contempt proceedings in district court or
before a United States commissioner for any person who "neglects or refuses" to comply with an I.R.S. summons."0
The I.R.S.'s lack of internal enforcement powers is significant in that the determination as to enforcement is made in an
adversarial setting in which the person summoned and other interested parties2' have an opportunity to raise objections to such
enforcement.
2
The Supreme Court in Reisman v. Caplin1
emphasized the
adversarial nature of the proceedings required to enforce an I.R.S.
summons. In that case, the taxpayer's lawyers sought to quash an
I.R.S. summons, served upon the taxpayer's accountants, by
19. 26 U.S.C. §7604 (a):
(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned under the
internal revenue laws to appear, testify, or to produce books, papers, records,
or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such
person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other
data.
See also 26 u.s.c. §7402(b):
(b) To enforce summons.-If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data,
the district court of the United States for the district in which such person
resides or may be found shall hav&jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel
such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 52 n.10 (1964) has concluded
that §§7604(a) and 7402(b) are virtually identical.
20. 26 U.S.C. §7604(b):
(b) Enforcement.-Whenever any person summoned under section
6420(e) (2), 6421 (M (2), 6424 (d) (2), 6427 (e) (2) or 7602 neglects or refuses to
obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to
give testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the
judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner for the district
within which the person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment
against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner
to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon
his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such
hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make
such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons
and to punish such person for his default or disobedience.
21. See text accompanying notes 108-131 infra for a detailed discussion on intervention with respect to Internal Revenue summons enforcement proceedings.
22. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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means of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Court,
in dismissing the action for lack of equity, held that the petitioners would have ample opportunity to challenge the summons,
first before the hearing officer and again in district court if the
government sought enforcement.
In reaching its decision the Court rejected the petitioner's
contention that injunctive relief was appropriate because refusal
to comply with the summons would subject the party so refusing
to contempt penalties under sections 7604(b) and 7210.1 The
Court held that neither section was applicable where the sum24
moned party appeared and attacked the summons in good faith.
The Court further held that enforcement orders are appealable,
and that stays could be issued to prevent injury while the summons was being tested. 25 Thus, the Reisman decision enunciated
the procedural means by which a summons issued pursuant to
section 7602 can be challenged.
Having considered the procedural framework involved, it is
appropriate to inquire into the grounds upon which refusal to
comply with an I.R.S. summons can be legitimately based.
Objections to I.R.S. summonses can be classified into two general
categories: objections based on a claim of abuse of the summons
power itself and objections based on a violation of a personal right
2
or privilege.
23. 26 U.S.C. §7604 (b): See note 20 supra; 26 U.S.C. §7210:
Any person who, being duly summoned to appear to testify, or to appear
and produce books, accounts, records, memoranda, or other papers, as required
under sections 6420(e) (2), 6421(f) (2), 6424(d) (2), 6427(e) (2), 7602, 7603 and
7604(b), neglects to appear or to produce such books, accounts, records, memoranda, or other papers, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with costs of
prosecution.
24. The Reisman court noted that §7610 facially only prescribed punishment where
the person summoned "neglects" to appear or to produce. Without determining exactly
what kinds of behavior would constitute "neglect", the court unequivicably stated that
".. . noncompliance is not subject to prosecution thereunder when the summons is attacked in good faith." [Footnote omitted]. 375 U.S. at 447.
As for §7604 (b), the Reisman Court concluded after reviewing the legislative history of
that section that the phrases "neglects or refused to obey such summons" was meant to
be applied only to persons who "wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply." 375 U.S. at 448. See also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51-2 (1964).
25. 375 U.S. at 449. The Court in Reisman also noted that a third party could properly seek an order restraining a witness from voluntarily complying with a summons until
an enforcement order was issued by the district court. Id. at 449-50. See also Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 519-20 (1971).
26. For cases involving abuse of process, see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517, 522 (1971) and cases cited therein. See also, United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757
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United States v. Powell,27 decided by the Supreme Court in
the same year as Reisman, has become one of the leading cases
on the first category of objections. The Powell Court summarized
the requirements which the I.R.S. must satisfy in order to obtain
enforcement of a summons issued pursuant to section 7602:8
[The Commissioner] must show that the investigation will
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry
may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is
not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed
The first requirement set forth above, that the investigation
must have a legitimate purpose is directly derived from section
7602. That section explicitly states the purposes for which the
I.R.S. is authorized to undertake investigations.2 9
The second requirement enunciated in Powell, that the government must show that the inquiry sought may be relevant to
the purposes of the investigation, also derives from section 7602.
Section 7602 limits the I.R.S.'s investigative authority to the taking of testimony and the obtaining of data which "may be relevant or material" to the purposes of the investigation." The key
word in the second requirement is "may." A showing by the government that the inspection sought "might have thrown light
upon" the correctness of the return or other proper purpose of the
investigation has been deemed sufficient." This standard has in
turn been interpreted to require "a realistic expectation rather
than an idle hope" that something will be discovered that will
32
bear on the inquiry.
(5th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973). For cases
involving violations of personal rights or privileges, see text accompanying notes 153-248
infra.
The broadest objection to an I.R.S. summons issued pursuant to §7602, that §7602 is
unconstitutional in that it violates the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, has been flatly rejected. See First National Bank v. United States,
267 U.S. 576 (1925) aff'g 295 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D. Ala. 1924) and United States v. First
National Bank, 274 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Ky. 1967) aff'd sub noma. Justice v. United
States, 390 U.S. 199 (1968).
27. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
28. Id. at 57-58.
29. See note 16 supra.
30. Id.
31. Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523-4 (2nd Cir. 1968); and Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183,
187 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 912 (1959).
32. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2nd Cir. 1968). See also United
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The last two requirements, which the I.R.S. must satisfy
before a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 will be enforced, refer to the protections afforded taxpayers in section
7605(b) against unnecessary examinations. Sec. 7605(b) provides
that:3 3
No taxpayer shall be subject to unnecessary examination or
investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of
account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer
requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional
inspection is necessary.
The objection to the I.R.S. summons issued in the Powell
case was based on the government's alleged failure to comply
with section 7605(b). In Powell, the respondent was summoned
to appear before a special agent34 to give testimony and produce
records relating to certain tax returns of the corporation of which
he was the president. The respondent appeared, but he refused
to produce the records in question on the grounds that the records
had been previously examined and the statute of limitations
3
The
barred any further tax assessment for the years in question5.
respondent argued that unless the government made a sufficient
showing that fraud was suspected, both the statute of limitations
and the "one inspection . . . for each taxable year" limitation
under section 7605(b) would prevent the court from enforcing the
summons. 6 The respondent further argued that the necessity requirement in section 7605(b) dictated that the government showing of suspected fraud be tested against a "probable cause" stanStates v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 515 (2nd Cir. 1971) and Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d
207, 212 (5th Cir. 1968).
33. 26 U.S.C. §7605 (b).
34. A special agent is an employee of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service. See note 49 infra for further explanation of the function of a special agent.
35. 26 U.S.C. §6501 (a) provides:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section the
amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after
the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date
prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after such tax became
due and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on which any part of such
tax was paid and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection
of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period.
36. There is no statute of limitations when civil tax fraud is involved. 26 U.S.C. §6501

(c)(1):
(1) False return.-In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the
intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.
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for the Court in Powell, rejected
dard.3 7 Justice Harlan, writing
3

the respondent's arguments:

We do not equate necessity as contemplated by [section
7605(b)] with probable cause or any like notion. If a taxpayer
has filed fraudulent returns, a tax liability exists without regard
to any period of limitations. .

.

. If, in order to determine the

existence or nonexistence of fraud in the taxpayer's returns,
information in the taxpayer's records is needed which is not
already in the Commissioner'spossession, we think the examination is not "unnecessary" within the meaning of section
7605(b). [Emphasis added]
In essence, the Powell decision interpreted the necessity requirement in section 7605(b) as only preventing the reexamination of a taxpayer's records where the information is already in the Commissioner's hands. Other than that, the showing
of necessity that is required for re-examination, even when the
normal three year statute of limitations has r.un, is no more than
a showing that the information sought "may be relevant" to the
"legitimate purpose" of the investigation as required by section
7602.
The emasculation of the necessity requirement by Powell
leaves the administrative step of written notification to the taxpayer as the only real requirement under section 7605(b) that the
government must satisfy before it can re-examine a taxpayer's
records.
As can be seen from the Powell case, the I.R.S. is given
3
considerable latitude in performing its investigative functions. 1
The investigative authority granted to the I.R.S. in section 7602
37. This argument was sustained in United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914 (3rd Cir.
1963), following O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958). Contra, Foster v.
United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2nd Cir. 1959).

38. 379 U.S. at 53. See also United Statesv. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. In several cases, courts have considered affidavits by agents of the I.R.S. sufficient to sustain the required governmental showing of the legal prerequisites to an enforceable summons. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 516 (3rd Cir. 1971); and United States v. Wozniak, 381 F.2d 764 (6th
Cir. 1967).
Additionally courts have denied taxpayers, contesting the validity of Internal Revenue
summonses, the use of traditional discovery procedures, see, e.g., United States v. Bell,
448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Ruggerio, 425 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922
(1971); United States v. Benford, 405 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969); and United States
v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D. Md. 1971). But see United States v. Round.
tree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
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has been likened to the authority of a grand jury in terms of its
scope and minimal checks." The Powell Court noted, however,
that the latitude given the government in pursuing its investigative functions is not meant to deny the taxpayer the right to
challenge a summons issued for an improper purpose."
Probably the most common claim of abuse of the summons
power of the I.R.S. is that the summons was issued for the improper purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. In Reisman, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the appropriateness of this objection to an I.R.S. summons when it
42
stated:
[T]he witness may challange the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the
defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of
obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution ....
The basis for the argument that the use of the I.R.S. summons power to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution would
3
be improper is that it would be outside the scope of section 7602.1
Circuit court cases44 decided on this issue after Reisman uniformly held that a summons issued for the proper purpose of
assessing civil tax liability would not be voided because the information obtained may also have been used as evidence for a possible future criminal prosecution. Boren v. Tucker, 5 the case cited
by Reisman for the proposition that the use of the summons to
gather evidence for a criminal prosecution was improper, clearly
held that a summons issued for the dual purpose of assessing civil
liability and obtaining evidence for possible criminal violations
would be enforced.46 The court in Boren did indicate, however,
that where a criminal prosecution of the taxpayer was already
40. 379 U.S. at 57. See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971)
(Justice Douglas, concurring opinion); United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.
1971); and Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1953).
41. 379 U.S. at 58. See also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
42. 375 U.S. at 449.
43. §7602 only authorizes the use of an administrative summons to gather information for civil income tax purposes. See note 16 supra.
44. See United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1037 (1970); United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 835 (1969); United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 928 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 973 (1969); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1968); McGarry
v. Riley, 363 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966); Wild v. United
States, 362 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1966).
45. 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
46. Id. at 772-73.
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pending at the time the I.R.S. summons was issued, a different
result might be reached. 7
As a result of the circuit court decisions enforcing summonses
issued for the dual purpose of assessing civil liability and obtaining evidence for possible criminal violations, the objection began
to be raised in a new form. Litigants protested that the summons
was issued for the sole purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution." In its new form, the objection most often arises
when the summons is issued by a special agent rather than a
revenue agent, because it is the special agent's function to determine whether there have been any criminal violations."
5 atThe Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States"
tempted to resolve the issue of when a summons challenged on
the basis thatoit was issued for the improper purpose of gathering
evidence for a criminal prosecution would be unenforceable. The
I.R.S. summonses in question in the Donaldson case were issued
by a special agent to a third party, the Acme Circus Operating
Co., Inc., d/b/a Clyde Beatty-Cole Bros. Circus, and to Joseph J.
Mercurio, Acme's accountant. Donaldson, the taxpayer, obtained
preliminary injunctions restraining the parties summoned from
complying until a judicial enforcement proceeding was held and
an order issued requiring such compliance. At the ensuing enforcement proceeding, Donaldson attempted to intervene and
47. Id. The court distinguished United States v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D.C.
Mass. 1953), where the court refused to enforce a subpoena issued by special agent where
the taxpayer was already the subject of a criminal prosecution.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggerio, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. denied,
400 U.S. 922 (1971); and United States v. Erdner, 422 F.2d 835 (3rd Cir. 1970).
49. The I.R.S. has both an Audit Division and an Intelligence Division within each
district office. The investigators assigned to the Audit Division are called revenue agents
and their primary responsibility is to investigate civil aspects of enforcement o the revenue
laws. The investigators for the Intelligence Division are called special agents and their
primary function is to conduct civil and criminal tax fraud investigations. The special
agent is usually assigned to a case upon the recommendation of the revenue agent to the
Intelligence Divison that his investigation has indicated that there is a possibility of fraud.
Although the Audit Division and Intelligence Division have distinct functions, there is
considerable overlap and interplay between agents from the two divisions in investigations
where civil as well as criminal liability is suspected. The revenue agent will not in most
cases complete his audit before recommending that the Intelligence Division be called in.
In fact the revenue agent is required by the I.R.S. procedures to make that recommendation when he first suspects the possibility of fraud. The revenue agent is not removed from
the investigation once such a recommendation has been made, but rather he continues
his audit for the purpose of assisting the special agent in his investigation of civil tax fraud.
See generally, Lipton, Constitutional Protectionfor Books and Records in Tax Fraud
Investigations, 29 N.Y.U. INST. OF TAx. 945 (1971).
50. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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challenge the summonses on the ground that they were issued for
the sole purpose of obtaining evidence concerning criminal violations of the tax laws and as such were outside the scope of section
7602. The district court denied both petitioners' motions to intervene and to quash the summonses; the court of appeals affirmed.51
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, after sustaining the
lower court's denial of intervention, 52 proceeded to determine the
validity of the challenges raised against enforcement of the summonses. The Court in Donaldson followed the court of appeals
cases5 3 which ordered enforcement of I.R.S. summonses issued for
both civil and criminal purposes. Citing treasury regulations and
various sections of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court in
Donaldson stated that: "Congress clearly has authorized the use
of the summons in investigating what may prove to be criminal
conduct." 5
The taxpayer in Donaldson,however, had contended that the
instant summonses were issued for the sole purpose of obtaining
evidence for a criminal prosecution so that the dual purpose cases
were not determinitive as to their validity. The basis of the taxpayer's sole purpose objection was that the summonses were issued by a special agent whose function is to gather evidence for
criminal prosecution. The Donaldson court reluctantly acknowledged that the Reisman dictum which gave impetus to the "gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution" objection, was applicable "to the situation of a pending criminal charge or, at most,
of an investigation solely for criminal purposes.' ' 5 [Emphasis
added]
Without eliminating the sole purpose standard, the Court in
Donaldsonsubstantially reduced its applicability by limiting the
circumstances that would satisfy that standard. In particular,
Donaldson rejected the argument that a summons issued by a
special agent would necessarily meet the sole purpose standard
because of the nature of the special agent's function. The opinon
concluded:
: * * that the special agent may well conduct his investigation
jointly with an agent from the Audit Division; that their com51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969).
See text accompanying notes 101-09 infra.
See cases cited in note 44 supra.
400 U.S. at 535.
Id. at 533.
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bined efforts are directed to both civil and criminal infractions;
and that any decision to recommend prosecution comes only
after the investigation is complete or is sufficiently far along to
support appropriate conclusions."
The overlapping functions of the special agents and the revenue agents and the close proximity in which they work during an
investigation enabled the Court to conclude that the point at
which the special agent arrived on the scene was not determinative in assessing that the investigation was solely criminal." Fur58
ther, the Court stated:
To draw a line where a special agent appears would require
the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud,
to forego either the use of the summons or the potentiality of an
ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw
that line and thus stultify enforcement of federal law.
The Donaldson court, recognizing the validity of the sole
purpose objection, attempted to establish an-objective standard
against which the sole purpose objection could be tested. In this
respect, the Court issued the following caveat: 59
We hold that under § 7602 an internal revenue summons
may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good
faith and prior to a recommendationfor criminal prosecution.
[Emphasis added]
The rationale for the "recommendation for prosecution"
standard is that a summons issued after a criminal prosecution
has been recommended will presumably be used solely to obtain
evidence for that prosecution.6" Statistical support for this presumption may be found in comparing the number of cases in
which recommendations for criminal prosecutions were made to
the number of cases in which there were, in fact, criminal prosecutions."1
56. Id. at 535.
57. See note 49 supra. The Donaldson court made reference in this regard to Mathis
v. United States, 391 U.S. (1968). For a discussion of Mathis see text accompanying notes
119-23 infra.
58. 400 U.S. at 535-36.
59. Id. at 536.
60. Although a presumption was not explicitly established in Donaldson, the court
reasoned that ". . . any decision to recommend prosecution comes only after the investigation is complete or is sufficiently far along to support appropriate conclusions." 400 U.S.
at 535.
61. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
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The "good faith" component of the Donaldson standard
seems to protect against the eventuality that a recommendation
for criminal prosecution is purposely delayed in order to afford
the I.R.S. the use of the summons power to obtain evidence for
that prosecution. The "recommendation for criminal prosecution" and "good faith" standards created in Donaldson have
raised new issues for the courts. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cromer,6" posed one of the
questions which has arisen in the wake of Donaldson:"
...Donaldson failed to identify which recommendation was
critical: the initial recommendation of the special agent, the
ultimate recommendation of the I.R.S. to the Department of
Justice, or some intermediate recommendation.
Lower court decisions have been divided on this issue, with
some cases64 holding that the recommendation for prosecution
standard established in Donaldson refers to the point at which
the case is turned over to the Justice Department, while other
cases65 imply that the standard enunciated in Donaldsonrefers to
the special agent's recommendation to his superiors. The Court
6
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Billingsley"
is the only case at that judicial level to definitively hold that the
"recommendation for criminal prosecution" in the Donaldson
standard means the referral of the case to the Department of
Justice.
We hold . . . the the [sic] recommendation referred to in
Donaldson occurs, at the earliest, when the Internal Revenue
Service forwards a case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.
In Billingsley, the special agent had been involved in an
investigation, initiated by the I.R.S. Audit Division, for over a
year when he recommended to his immediate supervisor that
criminal charges for tax evasion and filing of a false return be
62. 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 101.
64. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Kyriaco, 326 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (C.D. Cal.), on reconsiderationafter cert. denied
without prejudice, 401 U.S. 1922 (1971).
65. See United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1972); and United States v. Oaks, 73-2
USTC 9745 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
66. 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972).
67. Id. at 1209.
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brought against the taxpayer. The special agent's recommendation was approved by his immediate supervisor and the Chief of
the Intelligence Division in Oklahoma City. The recommendation
was next forwarded to the Assistant Regional Commissioner of
the Intelligence Division. The Office of the Assistant Regional
Commissioner requested further information regarding specific
transactions involving the taxpayer, whereupon summonses were
issued by the special agent in order to obtain the requested information.
The district court 8 sustained the defendant's argument that
the initial recommendation of the special agent was the crucial
one and that the summonses issued subsequent to that recommendation were unenforceable. In reversing the district court, the
court of appeals in Billingsley reasoned:6 9
While a criminal investigation remains solely within the
[I.R.S.], the civil aspects are inextricably associated with the
criminal. See Donaldson v. United States, supra 400 U.S. at
534-35, 91 S. Ct. § 34, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580. It is not until the
Service refers a case to the Department of Justice, however, that
two distinct agencies are involved and the civil and criminal
aspects at least begin to disentagle. . . . Heeney's [special
agent] recommendation to his superiors in the Service that
Mills [taxpayer] be criminally prosecuted did not reorient the
investigation so that its sole object was criminal in nature. That
Mills might be indicted and prosecuted remained a mere
possibility. [Emphasis added].
The citation to Donaldson in the preceding quote is misleading. Although it is true that Donaldson discussed the intermingling of the criminal and civil aspects during an I.R.S. investigation, it did so in reference to the special agent's initial appearance in the case and not to the stage of investigation taking place
after the special agent recommended prosecution."
68. 331 F. Supp. 1091, 1092 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
69. 469 F.2d at 1209-10.
70. The Donaldson court specifically stated:
There is no statutory suggestion for any meanngful line of distinction, for civil
as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a special agent's appearance. To draw a line where a special agent appearswould require the Service,
in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forego either the use of
the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. [400 U.S. at 535-36. (Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted)].
The appellee's argument in Billingsley that "recommendation" must refer to recommendation by the special agent because the term "recommendation" appears in the I.R.S.'s
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Support for the position that "recommendation" was intended to mean recommendation by the special agent can be
found in the statistical data cited in Donaldson." Contrary to the
Billingsley court's claim that even after recommendation for
prosecution is made by the special agent there is still only a
"mere possibility" that criminal prosecution will ensue, the statistics show that after recommendation for prosecution by the
special agent has2 been made criminal prosecution is in fact more
7
likely than not.
Tacit support for the proposition that the critical "recommendation" under Donaldson occurs sometimes before the case
is referred to the Justice Department can be found in United
States v. White,7 3 a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case. Although
other issues were of primary concern in White,74 both the majority
and dissenting opinions dealt with the appellant's challenge to
enforcement of the summons on an improper use basis. The majority made a point of the fact that "no recommendation for criminal prosecution had been made either at the time the summons
was issued or at the time enforcement was sought."75 [Emphasis
added]. The inclusion of the latter phrase in the above statement
might be read to imply that there was indeed a recommendation
for criminal prosecution at some later time. Judge Ainsworth,
dissenting, provided the missing information when he related
that the taxpayer was notified by the Chief of the Intelligence
Division of the Office of the District Director that a recommendation for criminal prosecution was made to the Regional Counsel
Statement of Organizationand Function is in reference to the special agent's function,
may have been properly rejected by the court as a glorification of form over substance.
Nevertheless, the Donaldson court cited the same sections of the Statement of Organization and Functionin its decision and chose the term "recommendation" in its holding and
not "review", "approval", "referral" or "ultimate recommendation".
71. 400 U.S. at 535, n.17. The statistical data referred to in note 17 in Donaldson
concerning "recommendation for prosecution" were the "recommendations for prosecution" by special agents of the Intelligence Division and not statistical data concerning
"referrals" by the I.R.S to the Department of Justice, which data are reported in a
different table in the Commissioner's Annual Report. See, 1969, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

at 28-29.

72. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra for 1972 Internal Revenue statistics
demonstrating that there is a "substantial probability", rather than "mere possibility",
of a conviction resulting from a special agent's recommendation to prosecute.
73. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
74. The primary concern in the White case was the claim by the taxpayer's attorney
that he could assert the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. See text accompanying notes 363-69 infra.
75. 477 F.2d at 761.
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while the appeal was pending. 6
Assuming that at the time of the appeal in White the case
had not been referred to the Justice Department, the majority's
concern over the timing of the recommendation can be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgement that the intra-I.R.S. recommendation for prosecution was the crucial one as far as the
Donaldson standard is concerned.
The White dissent also indirectly acknowledged that an
intra-I.R.S. recommendation would prevent a subsequent use of
the summons when, in referring to the recommendation made by
the Chief of the Intelligence Division of the District Director to
the Regional Counsel, it stated: "The recommendation should
not have been delayed to take advantage of a civil summons.""
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. National State Bank18 indicated that it considered the
recommendation of the special agent to be the recommendation
referred to in the Donaldson standard. In National State Bank,
the intervenor's challenge of improper purpose was held to be
negated by the Donaldsondecision which was handed down a few
weeks before oral argument in the district court to stay enforcement of the summons. The court of appeals in determining that
there had been no recommendation for criminal prosecution, referred to the testimony of the special agent taken at the enforcement hearing:
. . . that he [special agent] entered the case because of
"possible criminal behavior"; that an audit of the tax liability
would necessarily precede a recommendation by him of criminal
prosecution; that he performed certain "audit functions"; that
any recommendation for prosecution would be based on his report which would follow completion of the investigation; and
that the investigation was not completed and the report not yet
filed. 9
To allow the I.R.S. to use the administrative summons after
the special agent has made a recommendation for criminal prosecution would be to allow the summons to be used in many cases
for the sole purpose of gathering evidence for that criminal prosecution. The Billingsley case appears to be a good example. The
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 765.
Id.
454 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1251.
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special agent's recommendation had been approved by two superiors before the Assistant Regional Commissioner made the request for additional information which led to the issuance of the
summons. It is difficult to believe at that stage, that the additional information was not being sought for the sole purpose of
strengthening the criminal case against the taxpayer. The contention of the Billingsley court that criminal prosecution was at
this stage still a "mere possibility" is without merit."
A second issue that has received considerable attention following the Donaldsondecision is whether a summons issued prior
to a recommendation for criminal prosecution is enforceable after
such recommendation has been made. The majority of courts
have held that the validity of the summons is tested as of the date
of its issuance.81
In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc.,82 a Second Circuit
Court of Appeals case decided prior to Donaldson, is representative of the majority viewpoint. In In re Magnus, an indictment
was issued against the taxpayer ten months after the issuance of
an I.R.S. summons, but prior to its enforcement. In holding that
the summons was enforceable despite the intervening indictment,
3
the Court stated:1
To prevent enforcement of such summonses because compliance was resisted for such a lengthy period that the government was forced to return an indictment to prevent the criminal
statute of limitations from running would encourage litigants to
resist such summonses wholly for the purpose of delay .... The
summonses as originally issued came well within the purposes
designated in the statute, and we deem the time of issuance to
be the significant date on which to base a determination of the
validity of a Section 7602 summons.
The opposing view was most forecefully stated in United
States v. Kyriaco4 a California district court case decided just
after Donaldson. In referring to the "recommendation for crimi80. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
81. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 461 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moriarty, 435 F.2d 347, 349
(7th Cir. 1970); In re Magnus v. Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12, 16 (2nd Cir. 1962).

But see United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
82. 311 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1962).
83. Id. at 16.
84. 326 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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nal prosecution" standard established in Donaldson, the court
85

stated:

It strains the meaning of the [Donaldson] Court to conclude

. . .

that motive at the time of issuance is the ultimate

fact, requiring enforcement irrespective of what subsequently
occurs. Implicit in the validity of a summons is the use to which
the information obtained is to be put.
The Kyriaco view has not been widely followed. In fact, the
Kyriaco case itself was silently overruled by the Court of Appeals
8 which, citing
for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cromer"
Magnus, held that the validity of the summons is tested as of its
date of issuance.
The "good faith" component of the Donaldson standard has
been invoked by taxpayers in challenging the validity of summonses where subsequent to the date of issuance and prior to enforcement, prosecution was recommended or an indictment was issued. The argument is that since the recommendation or indictment was made without the aid of the information sought in the
unenforced summons, the government must have had sufficient
evidence to make the recommendation or issue the indictment at
the time the summons was issued. If this is true, and the government held off on the recommendation for prosecution or the indictments in order to be able to make use of the administrative
summons, it can be said that the government did not issue the
summons in "good faith" as required by Donaldson. This argument has been consistently rejected by the courts where the indictment was only issued in order to prevent a statute of limitations bar.8"
In the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States
v. White,88 where there was apparently no statute of limitation
problem, a recommendation for prosecution was made during the
pendency of an appeal taken from an enforcement proceeding.
Judge Ainsworth, in his dissenting opinion, stated that he
doubted that the government had met the "good faith" requisite
89
promulgated in Donaldson:
85. Id. at 1185.
86. 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973).
87. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moriarty,
435 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir.
1962).
88. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. Id. at 765. The majority in White concluded that the summons was validly issued
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There is strong reason to believe that the Government was
not acting in good faith when it served the instant summons.
The case had initially been investigated for some time by an
Internal Revenue Agent and the Special Agent of the Intelligence Division was called in later. Even though a recommendation for prosecution had not been made at the time the summons issued, the Service had sufficient information available
upon whichi to base a recommendation. The recommendation
should not have been delayed to take advantage of a civil summons.
It would seem that Judge Ainsworth's statements are correct
if the "good faith" component of the Donaldson standard is to
have any meaning at all. This is not to say that bad faith must
be implied whenever there is an intervening recommendation for
criminal prosecution or indictment. However, the courts should
seriously consider such a recommendation or indictment in assessing whether or not the government has met the "good faith"
standard."0
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United States
v. Weingarden,9' reached the incredible conclusion that
Donaldsondid not establish "recommendation for criminal prosecution" as the standard for quashing a section 7602 summons, in
part because that court ignored the "good faith" part of the
Donaldsonstandard. The court in Weingarden rightfully rejected
the government contentions that "there is but a single standard
for determining whether the court's process is being abused,
namely, the 'recommendation for prosecution' standard"92 and
"that regardless of singular motives of criminal prosecution, the
summons is not invalid until there has been an actual recommendation to the Justice Department that the taxpayer be prosecuted."9 However, instead of dismissing the government's argument on the obvious grounds that it failed to recognize the "good
because there had not been a "recommendation for prosecution" at either the time the
summons was issued or the time enforcement was sought. Presumably, the majority felt
it was unnecessary to even consider the "good faith" element of the Donaldsontest under
such circumstances.
90. In cases where a "recommendation for prosecution" precedes a final determination of whether the summons is enforceable, except in those cases where the recommendation is necessary to bar the running of the statute of limitations, Judge Ainsworth's
conclusion that the Internal Revenue agents are acting in bad faith appears correct and
provides a reasonable standard for interpreting the Donaldson decision.
91. 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
92. Id. at 459.
93. Id.
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faith" requirement specifically included in the Donaldson standard, the Court in Weingarden resurrected the sole purpose language found in Reisman and cited in Donaldson.4 The confusion
exhibited by the court of appeals in the recent Weingarden case
serves to indicate the generally unsettled nature of the law with
regard to the proper use of I.R.S. summonses.
INTERVENTION

During the course of an I.R.S. income tax investigation, a
summons authorized under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code is often issued to a party other than the taxpayer under
investigation in order to ascertain information concerning the tax
liability of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's opportunity to prevent
enforcement of a summons issued to a third party is dependent
on his ability to intervene in the enforcement proceeding. 5 The
taxpayer can usually obtain a temporary restraining order from
the district court preventing the summoned party from voluntarily complying with the summons until an enforcement order is
issued by the court, thereby insuring that an enforcement proceeding will be held.9"
The authorization for intervention by the taxpayer97 in an
I.R.S. enforcement proceeding is derived from Rules 24 and
81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 24(a) provides for intervention as a matter of right and Rule 24(b) provides
for permissive intervention.
94. Although the Weingarden court was correct in its conclusion, that Donaldson did
not dismiss the "sole purpose objection" to the issuance of a summons, the court failed
to recognize that Donaldsonestablished a dual standard, "recommendation for prosecution" and "good faith", for the purpose of determining whether the "sole purpose objection" is satisfied. The Weingarden court ignored the "good faith" component of the dual
standard and substituted the pre-Donaldson criteria for the "sole purpose objection."
95. A possible exception to the need for the taxpayer to intervene is where a court
will permit the taxpayer's attorney to assert his legal rights and privileges in a summons
proceeding seeking to obtain records from the attorney. See text accompanying notes 32871 infra.
96. The Supreme Court in Reisman v. Caplin specifically acknowledged the availability of such a procedure. 375 U.S. 440, 449-50. In Donaldson, the taxpayer obtained a
temporary restraining order from the district court preventing voluntary compliance on
the part of the summoned party, until enforcement was ordered by a court after a formal
enforcement proceeding in which the taxpayer was able to move to intervene.
97. It is unlikely that a party other than the taxpayer being investigated would seek
to intervene to prevent enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons even though such
invention might be allowed under Rules 24 and 81 (a)(3) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
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Rule 24. Intervention.
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute
of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and
he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party
to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application
may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
Rule 24 is made applicable to I.R.S. summons enforcement
proceedings under Rule 81(a)(3) which provides, in part, that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to:
proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of
documents in accordance with a subpeona issued by an officer
or agency of the United States under any statute of the United
States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the
district court or by order of the court in the proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Reisman v. Caplin95 specifically acknowledged that taxpayers may intervene in I.R.S. summons enforcement proceedings: "[T]hird parties might intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to
the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene."9 9
The court of appeals cases' 0 that followed interpreted the
98. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
99. Id. at 449.
100. United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3rd Cir. 1969); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312,
314 (6th Cir. 1966). But see O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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Reisman language as giving the taxpayer under investigation the
right to intervene in any case in which he was not the summoned
party. This interpretation was later rejected by the Supreme
Court in Donaldson v. United States.'"' The Court in Donaldson
affirmed the lower court's denial of the taxpayer's motion to intervene in the district court enforcement proceeding. The proceeding was instituted by the government to enforce an I.R.S.
summons issued to the taxpayer's alleged former employer, Acme
Co., and that company's accountant, Mercurio. In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court in Donaldson explained away both
the language in Reisman and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court next rejected Donaldson's argument that Rule
24(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Reisman
decision gave the taxpayer under investigation an absolute right
to intervene in I.R.S. summons enforcement proceedings. The
langauage in Reisman according to Donaldson was "permissive
only and not mandatory" ' 2 and "did not there pronounce...
that the taxpayer possesses an absolute right to intervene in any
internal revenue summons proceedings.1 0 3
The Court emphasized the tenuous relationship between the
taxpayer and the material sought in the summons."'
The material sought, as has been noted, consists only of Acme's
routine business records in which the taxpayer has no proprietary interest of any kind, which are not the work product of his
attorney or accountant, and which enjoy no established
attorney-client or other privilege. Donaldson's only interest...
lies in the fact that those records presumably contain details of
Acme-to-Donaldson payments possessing significance for federal income tax purposes.
The Donaldson Court determined that the taxpayer's interest,
that the information sought related to his tax liability, was not
enough to bring that taxpayer under the ambit of Rule 24(a) (2).
This interest cannot be the kind contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2)
when it speaks in general terms of 'an interest relating to the
385 U.S. 969 (1966); and In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2nd
(1965).
101.
102.
103.
104.

Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950

400 U.S. 517 (1971).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 530-31.
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property or transaction which is the subject of the action.' What
is obviously meant there is a significantly protectable interest.'0 5
Having determined that the taxpayer did not have the requisite interest to come under Rule 24(a) (2) and having limited the
scope of the Reisman decision, the Court could have affirmed,
without further discussion, the district court's denial of the taxpayer's motion to intervene as a matter of right. The Court in
Donaldson, however, went on to imply that even in cases where
the taxpayer could assert a "significantly protectable interest,"
he would not be entitled to intervene as a matter of right under
Rule 24(a). The Court's statement that "the taxpayer, to the
extent that he has such a protectable interest, as for example, by
way of privilege, . . may always assert that interest. . . in due
course at its proper place in any subsequent trial,"'0 6 can only be
read to mean that the taxpayer under such circumstances can be
denied the opportunity to intervene in the enforcement proceedings. Further support for the proposition that Donaldson eliminated intervention as of right for taxpayers with a protectable
interest in the material sought, as well as for taxpayers who did
not have such an interest, can be found in the Court's emphasis
of the proviso in Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court stated that: "Rule 81(a)(3) goes on specifically
to recognize that a district court, by local rule or by order, may
limit the application of the rules in a summons proceeding."'' 07
Had the Court in Donaldson merely decided that the taxpayer did not meet the criteria for intervention of right under
Rule 24(a)(2), there would have been no reason for the Court to
show that the application of Rule 24(a) to summons proceedings
can be limited by the courts under Rule 81(a)(3). In effect, the
Donaldson Court reduced intervention as a matter of right to
permissive intervention for summons enforcement proceedings.
Thus, the taxpayer's ability to intervene is left to the discretion
of the district court judge.'
105. Id. at 531. The Donaldson court indicated that a proprietary interest in the
documents sought, a privilege with respect to the documents sought, or an abuse of process
claim are examples of a significantly protectable interest to permit the taxpayer to intervene.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 528.
108. See the White decision where the court discussed the district court's denial of
intervention and the possibility that the denial was erroneous. No decision was reached
because the taxpayer had not appealed the denial. 477 F.2d at 759, n.2. See also the Couch
decision where the court concluded that intervention was properly permitted where the
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The Donaldson Court did not directly consider permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. There is no indication that the taxpayer even relied
on Rule 24(b)(2) in his motion to intervene as a back up to his
claim of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). In any event the district court's denial of Donaldson'smotion was in keeping with the
court's discretionary powers under Rule 24(b)(2). However, the
Donaldson Court did indicate in its holding that the taxpayer's
interest in the enforcement proceeding was not enough to warrant
intervention even on a permissive basis,' 9 thereby establishing a
standard to limit judicial discretion in so far as permissibe intervention is concerned.
The limitation on permissive intervention alluded to in
Donaldson was followed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Newman.110 The taxpayer attempting
to intervene in the Newman case, like the taxpayer in Donaldson,
had no proprietory interest in the materials summoned. The district court, in a decision rendered prior to the Donaldsondecision,
allowed the taxpayer to intervene as a matter of right. The court
of appeals in Newman reversed the district court on the basis of
the by then decided Donaldson case. After dismissing the taxpayer's claim that he could intervene as a matter of right, the
court in Newman rejected the taxpayer's argument, made for the
first time on appeal, that the district court order allowing the
taxpayer to intervene should have been affirmed if not as a matter of right then on a permissive basis. The court further rejected
the taxpayer's argument that the case should at least be remanded to the district court with the question of intervention left
to the discretion of the judge. The court in Newman held that to
permit the taxpayer to intervene under the factual circumstances
there presented would be an abuse of the court's discretion."'
In apparent contradiction to the Donaldson and Newman
taxpayer owned the business records which the summons sought. 409 U.S. at 327.
109. After concluding that there is no absolute right to intervene in an Internal
Revenue summons enforcement proceeding, the Donaldson court justified its denial of
intervention by stating:
We therefore hold that the taxpayer's interest is not enough and is not of sufficient magnitude for us to conclude that he is to be allowed to intervene. Were
we to hold otherwise, as he would have us do, we would unwarrantly cast doubt
upon and stultify the Service's every investigatory move. [400 U.S. at 531.
(Emphasis added)].
110. 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
111. Id. at 172-3.
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limitation on permissive intervention, the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Northwest
Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Company"' permitted a taxpayer,
who had no proprietary interest or privilege of any kind with
respect to the records summoned, to intervene in the enforcement
proceeding. The court based its decision to allow the taxpayer to
intervene on the fact that during the course of the proceedings a
recommendation for criminal prosecution was being considered
within the I.R.S." 3
The question raised by Northwest Pennsylvania Bank &
Trust Company is whether a taxpayer, who would ordinarily be
denied permission to intervene, should be allowed to intervene if
there is a serious question of governmental abuse of the summons
power. The Donaldson case does not provide a ready answer to
this question. In Donaldson, the Court, denying permission to
the taxpayer to intervene, stated that it need not have addressed
itself to the abuse of process challenge." 4 Yet, the Court in
Donaldson did address that challenge. If the Court had thought
that there was an abuse of the summons power, would its decision
on the taxpayer's motion to intervene have been different?
Perhaps the answer to the issue raised by Northwest Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Company can be found by studying the
policy consideration that underlay the Donaldson decision. Perhaps, too, the Donaldson denial of the concept of intervention as
a matter of right and limitation placed on permissive intervention
can be more readily understood in light of that policy consideration. The policy consideration reflected throughout the
Donaldson decision was that Court's determination not to "unwarrantedly cast doubt upon or stultify the Service's every investigatory move. '' 1 5 It would seem that where allowing the taxpayer
to intervene would merely serve to delay the enforcement proceeding, a denial of permission to intervene would serve the policy
consideration acknowledged in Donaldson."' On the other hand,
112. 355 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
113. The court permitted intervention to allow the taxpayer to claim abuse of process
because the Chief of the Intelligence Division had written the taxpayer giving him the
right to appear before the Division would make its final decision whether to recommend
prosecution. Appendix I, 355 F. Supp. at 616.
114. 400 U.S. at 531.
115. Id.
116. See note 109 supra. See also United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 173 (5th
Cir. 1971) where the court, in denying intervention, agreed with the Donaldsonreasoning:
. . .valid Congressional policies would be adversely affected if this "outsider"
were permitted to take over the controversy significantly.
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where the taxpayer seeks to raise a meritorious objection, permitting him to intervene would not serve to "unwarrantedly" prolong
the I.R.S.'s investigation.
Miranda
There has been a considerable amount of litigation in the
federal courts concerning the taxpayer's right to constitutional
warnings during the course of an income tax investigation. Following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Miranda v.
Arizona'"7 the issue has centered on the applicability of the prophylactic measures established in that decision to tax investigations.
The Supreme Court, in Mirandaheld that in order to insure
the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination, a suspect in custody must be given comprehensive
warnings before he may be interrogated by the authorities in the
course of a criminal investigation. The warnings required by the
Court include fully informing the suspect of his right to remain
silent, the possible use against him of his incriminating statements, and his right to have either his own or an appointed attor8
ney present."
Two years after the Mirandadecision, the Supreme Court in
Mathis v. United States"' held that the constitutional warnings
required by Mirandawere applicable to income tax investigations
where the taxpayer was in custody. In reaching its decision, the
Court rejected the government's contention that Miranda warnings were not applicable because the interrogation there in question was part of a routine civil income tax investigation where no
criminal proceedings might have been brought. Justice Black reasoned:'20
It is true that a 'routine tax investigation' may be initiated
for the purpose of a civil action rather than criminal prosecution. To this extent tax investigations differ from investigations
of murder, robbery, and other crimes. But tax investigations
frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, just as the one here
did. . . .And, as the investigating revenue agent was compelled to admit, there was always the possibility during his investigation, that his work would end up in a criminal prosecution.
117.
118.
119.
120.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 444.
391 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 4.
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The Court concluded that the distinction drawn by the government between tax investigations and investigations of other
crimes was "too minor and shadowy"' 2 ' to justify the absence of
Miranda warnings where the taxpayer was in custody.' Clearly,
the Mathis decision repudicated the notion expounded in a number of circuit court of appeal opinions'2 that tax investigations by
their very nature are immune from the application of Mirandatype warnings. However, the unusual factual circumstances of
the Mathis case have limited its effectiveness in extending
Miranda warnings to income tax investigations in general. The
taxpayer in Mathis was serving a sentence in a Florida state
penitentiary for an unrelated offense at the time he was questioned by the Internal Revenue agent. Hence, in the Mathis case
there was the element of custody which is not so glaringly present
in most tax investigations.
The vast majority of circuit courts have ruled that Miranda
warnings are not constitutionally required in income tax investigations where the individual interrogated was not deemed to be
in custody at the time.2 4 These courts have relied on the repeated
references in Mirandato the inherent evils of custodial interrogation,'2 5 and the explicit limitations of the holding to cases involv-

121. Id.
122. The court in Mathis similarly rejected the government's argument that Miranda
was not applicable because the taxpayer was not "in custody" in connection with the
instant income tax investigation.
123. Selinger v. Bigler, 377 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1967); Kohatsu v. United States, 351
F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); United States v. Scalafani,
265 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
124. Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 561 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S.
316 (1969); United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89, 91 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
912 (1970); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417-19 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1030-31 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Maius, 378
F.2d 716, 718-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967); United States v. Engle, 458
F.2d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1970);
Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1969).
125. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 440-458. The court in Mirandastated, for
example, in speaking of custodial interrogation:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical
intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compul-
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ing such custodial interrogation. 2 6 The majority of cases have
consistently concluded on a variety of facts that questioning, including requests for production of books and records by Internal
Revenue agents, both revenue and special, in the course of an
income tax investigation, does not constitute a custodial interrogation. 2 1 This determination is made by comparing the facts of
a particular case with the definition of custodial interrogation
12
expounded in Miranda. 1
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officiers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
The later Supreme Court case of Orozco v. Texas,2 9 which
held that a suspect questioned by police in his own bedroom at
four o'clock in the morning had been significantly deprived of his
freedom of action so as to require the giving of Mirandawarnings,
has been distinguished, as has been the Mathis case, by those
courts holding Miranda inapplicable to income tax investiga-

tions.3 0

The "no-custody" cases commonly emphasize the friendly

atmosphere of the particular investigation 3 ' and the amicable
nature of the Internal Revenue interrogator. 3 2 Such factors as
whether the questioning took place during normal working
hours, 1 at the taxpayer's own home, 134 or office 3 1 with other persion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. [384 U.S. at 457-58.]
126. 384 U.S. at 439, 444, 467, 477, 478.
127. See cases cited in note 124 supra.
128. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). It is interesting to note here that the court in footnote
4 mentioned that this is what they meant in Escobedo when they spoke of an investigation
which has focused on an accused. It would seem that, although the "in custody" and
"focus on the accused" analysis may well dovetail in most situations, the two do not
readily coincide in an analysis of tax investigations.
129. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
130. See United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 420 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971) and United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1029 n.12 (5th Cir.
1970).
131. See United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970), cet. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970); and United States v. Bagdasian,
398 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1968).
132. See United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); and
United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1970).
133. See United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
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sons friendly to the taxpayer present' 36 have been cited in an
attempt to show that income tax investigation interviews, unlike
the custodial interrogations with which Miranda dealt, are not
inherently coercive.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is the only
appellate court to require that Miranda warnings be given in
income tax investigations in the absence of custody. 3 ' The court
of appeals in United States v. Dickerson,3 ' affirmed the district
court's ruling granting the defendant's motion to suppress certain
evidence obtained from the defendant by revenue agents in a
prosecution for failure to file income tax returns. The defendant's
motion was based on the failure of the investigating agents, both
Revenue Agent Petrovic and Special Agent Cornue, to warn him
of his constitutional rights at any time during the five interviews
they have with him.
Judge Cummings, writing for the majority, refused to let the
custody requirement thwart the application of the protections
enunciated in Miranda. In speaking of Miranda, Judge Cummings stated:'39
No contention is made that the privilege against selfincrimination does not protect one interrogated in a noncustodial setting, only that one in such circumstances has no
need of advice as to his rights ....
But custodial interrogation
is merely one variety of confrontation, albeit one requiring the
most stringent of protections for the criminal suspect. The inquiry does not end with custody or its absence.
400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89, 91 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970);
and Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920
(1967).
134. See United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 1972) and United
States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1968).
135. See United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970); and United States v. White, 417
F.2d 89, 91 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
136. See United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971) and United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89, 91 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
137. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1969). See also
United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Krilich, 470
F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir. 1972). Prior to Dickerson, the Seventh Circuit held Miranda
warnings applicable in a case where the taxpayer was questioned in his basement for an
extended period of time. See United States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969).
138. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
139. Id. at 1114.
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Judge Cumming's inquiry into the nature of tax investigations led him to the conclusion that Mirandawarnings are necessary if the taxpayer is to be afforded the opportunity for intelligent exercise or waiver of his constitutional rights.
Incriminating statements elicited in reliance upon the taxpayer's misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry, his
obligation to respond, and the possible consequences of doing so
must be regarded as equally violative of constitutional protections as
a custodial confession extracted without proper warn140
ings.
Possibly when a taxpayer is interviewed by a revenue agent
and certainly when interviewed by a special agent, it is an adversary situation in which the governmental authorities have "focused" on the criminal liability of an individual notwithstanding
the fact that there is no custody in that the taxpayer has not been
deprived of his freedom. That the Miranda decision sought to
extend its protections to this type of situation can be discerned
from the emphasis put on the intelligent exercise of constitutional
rights. "For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed
simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for
an intelligent decision as to its exercise."''
The fact that there is no custody in the traditional sense is
all the more reason why warnings are needed in federal income
tax investigations to, as was stated in Miranda, ". . . make the
individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the
adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting
42
solely in his interest."'
Dickerson concluded that the warnings must be given to the
taxpayer by either the revenue agent or special agent at the "inception of the first contact with the taxpayer after the case has
been transferred to the Intelligence Division."'' Judge Cum140. Id. at 1116.
141. 384 U.S. at 468.
142. Id. at 469: See Lynch, Miranda Warnings in Criminal Tax Investigations, 49
TAXFs 290, 290-91 (1970), where the author states:
The successful businessman, attorney, doctor, or accountant, as the case
may be, is apt to believe, on the basis of his past experiences in dealing with
others, that he can work with the Special Agent and explain everything to the
Agent's satisfaction. This seldom happens. . . .After the Agents have finished

with their investigation, the taxpayer may receive a letter from the Intelligence
Office informing him that his case is under consideration for possible criminal
prosecution. Consequently the taxpayer is shocked and surprised and usually
calls a lawyer.
143. 413 F.2d at 1117.
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mings in a footnote explained the policy reasons for not requiring
that the warnings be given at an earlier stage when he stated that
the court was "mindful of the disruptive effect which a blanket
requirement of warnings might have if applied to all civil investigations."'' In support of the time designated for the giving of
warnings in Dickerson, it can be argued that once the investigation has been turned over to the Intelligence Division there can
be no doubt as to the adversary nature of any further interrogations with respect to possible criminal liability.
While the federal courts grappled with the problem of constitutional warnings in income tax investigations, the I.R.S. in a
published news release, directed its special agents henceforth to
give Miranda-type warnings at their initial meeting with a taxpayer.' 45 The Fourth and First Circuits, in United States v.
Heffner 4' and United States v. Leahey 147 respectively, have held
on due process grounds that the I.R.S. must observe the warning
requirements established in its news release. In Heffner, the court
reversed defendant's conviction for income tax fraud because the
district court admitted testimony of the special agent obtained
during interviews with the taxpayer in which the taxpayer was
not given the constitutional warnings required by the news release. Relying on United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,'5
the court held that, where a government agency fails to observe
its own rules or procedures, its action will be struck down by the
courts.' Heffner also concluded that it made no difference that
144. Id. at 1116, n.10. Aside from the policy reasons for not requiring warnings to be
given, there is little reason even to require the warnings as late as the time when the
special agent is assigned to the cases, as established in Dickerson. In essence, once the
custody requirement is eliminated it seems that Mathis would require that Miranda
warnings be given when the revenue agent is assigned to the case. See text accompanying
notes 119-23 supra. It is important to note that the Dickerson court did not consider the
dual nature of the special agent's function, which was first recognized in Donaldson.
145. In 1967, the I.R.S. released I.R. No. 827 (October 3, 1967), 1967 C.C.H. STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 6832, which was superseded in 1968 by I.R. No. 949 (Nov. 26, 1968), 1968
C.C.H. STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6946. I.R. No. 949 requires the special agent at his initial
meeting with the taxpayer to "identify himself, describe his function, and advise the
taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him." He must also "tell the taxpayer
that he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering any questions or producing any documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney before
responding."
146. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970).
147. 434 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1970).
148. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
149. 420 F.2d at 811. The court stated the reason for its decision was "to prevent the
arbitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency's violation of its own procedures . . . . The arbitrary character of such a departure is in no way ameliorated by the
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the protection established by the I.R.S. in this case extended
beyond what was constitutionally mandated.
It is admitted, however, in the Leahey case that not every
departure by an agency from its own rules or procedures would
be a violation of due process. Two important reasons were advanced by the Leahey court in determining that the I.R.S.'s failure to adhere to this particular publicly stated procedure violated
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Unlike other
agency regulations, the procedures established in the news release
were, by its own words, designed to insure "uniformity in protection the Constitutional rights of all persons." 5 ' To allow evidence obtained in violation of the warning requirement would
deny to some taxpayers protection which was meant for all. The
key is that the procedure was established for the taxpayer's protection and not for an internal agency goal such as efficiency." '
It is important to understand that there are potentially substantially different legal consequences if the due process requirements resulting from the news release rather than the strict
Mirandarequirements are applied to a taxpayer under investigation by a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service. The due
process requirements do not require strict adherence to all the
Miranda warnings. The consequence of this is readily apparent
from the following statement of Judge Pettine in United States
52
v. Read:'
There is nothing in this evidence indicating that this defendant
was not competent to fully appreciate the true import of all that
transpired between him and the Internal Revenue agents. He is
a grammar school graduate with 'a couple years of high.'
fact that the ignored procedure was enunciated as an instruction in a 'News Release'."
Id. at 812.
150. 434 F.2d 7, 9 (quoting I.R.S. News Release No. 827, Oct. 3, 1967, 1967 C.C.H.
STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6832).
151. In contrast to the decisions reached in Leahey and Heffner on the I.R.S News
Release, the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Lockyer v. United States, 448 F.2d
417 (10th Cir. 1971), held that the procedural rule that revenue agents must turn the
investigation over to the Intelligence Division once fraud is indicated was not promulgated
primarily to benefit the taxpayer and, hence, departure from that procedure would not
be grounds for suppression.
152. 73-2 USTC 9499, 81573 (D.R.I. 1973). In Read, the court held the due process
requirements were satisfied where the special agent "told the defendant that he was
conducting a criminal investigation; that it was no longer an audit question and that he
had a right to an attorney, remain silent, and to non-production of records relating to tax
liability." Id. at 81573. The court did not consider it important that the agent inform this
defendant that his statements could be used against him in a criminal case.
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But, more importantly, the due process requirements derive
their foundation from the I.R.S. news release. If the I.R.S. should
decide to withdraw the news release, presumably the warning
requirements would be withdrawn also.
FIFTH AMENDMENT

PRIVILEGE

AGAINST COMPULSORY

SELF-

INCRIMINATION.

The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The
question to be considered is to what extent and under what circumstances can the raising of this constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination prevent judicial enforcement of an
I.R.S. summons issued during the course of a federal income tax
investigation of an individual taxpayer. One method of analyzing
the above mentioned question is to break the privilege down into
its basic elements and explore the relationship between each ele1 53
ment and the use of I.R.S. summonses.
"In Any Criminal Case"
The first element of the fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination that will be discussed is that which
provides that no person shall be compelled "in any criminal case"
to testify against himself.'54 An individual is only protected under
the privilege from giving evidence which may be used against him
in a criminal proceeding. With reference to the "in any criminal
case" element of the privilege, the courts have generally followed
the precept of constitutional jurisprudence that "constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed."' 5 5 The privilege has been held to be applicable
where the evidence compelled from the individual may be used
against him in a quasi-criminal proceeding.'55
The principal means of enforcing the privilege's protection
against compulsory self-incrimination has been the "exclusionary
rule," whereby the courts will render inadmissible in a criminal
57
proceeding any evidence obtained in violation of the privilege.'
153. The elements of the privilege are so inextricably related that an independent
analysis of the various elements is at times virtually impossible. As a result, in the
discussion of the elements of the privilege, there is often an apparent overlap.
154. The "in any criminal case" element is dealt with first because it is the most
easily separated from the other elements of the privilege.
155. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
156. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
157. See United States v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Romanelli v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue15 extended the "exclusionary
rule" to encompass a civil tax fraud proceeding. Romanelli reversed a Tax Court decision affirming the Commissioner's determination of deficiencies in income tax and the additional fifty
percent of deficiency civil tax fraud assessment.
The petitioner in Romanelli asserted that statements which
had been elicited from him by the investigating agents in violation of his fifth amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination were erroneously admitted into evidence in the Tax
Court. The statements in question were made by the petitioner
during an interview with special agents under circumstances
15
which, the court felt, required the giving of Mirandawarnings. 0
None were given. Thus, it is evident, and the court so concluded,
that the statements would have been inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution. The problem in the Romanelli case, however, was
that the Tax Court case in which the statements were admitted
was a civil proceeding. 6 ' The court of appeals decided that the
policy of deterrence underlying the exclusionary rule would best
be served by excluding the ill-obtained statements from the case
even though the proceeding was civil. The court stated:'
To permit them [I.R.S. agents] . . . to infringe upon Romanelli's constitutional protection against self-incrimination, to an
extent that the right to use his statements to establish a criminal charge was forfeited, but to award the advantage of using
his statements in establishing civil liability seems unwholesome
and an abuse of power.
158. 466 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1972).
159. The petitioner in Romanelli was extensively questioned by a special agent in his
liquor store while other special agents conducted a search of the premises pursuant to a
warrant. The door to the premises was locked by the agents and the petitioner was ordered
to empty his pockets and place their contents on the bar prior to the questioning period.
160. In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), the Supreme Court held that the
fifty percent of deficiency civil tax fraud assessment was not a penalty, and, therefore,
any proceeding before the lower courts to determine a taxpayer's liability for such assessment is a civil proceeding. In Helvering the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that
the civil tax fraud assessment would be double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment because he had been previously acquitted of criminal income tax fraud.
161. 466 F.2d 872, 879. Romanelli can be distinguished from Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938) on the grounds that the Romanelli court was considering excluding
evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right whereas the Helvering Court was
considering the issue of double jeopardy. The policy consideration in Romanelli was to
deter agents from abusing their investigatory powers. No such policy considerations existed in Helvering.
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The Romanelli adjunct to the "exclusionary rule" seems reasonable in view of the unique nature of income tax investigations. The
recognized dual function of the special agent to investigate both
criminal violations of the tax laws and also civil tax fraud,'62 and
the general intertwining of civil and criminal aspects of an income
tax investigation, 6 3 would make any distinction between a civil
and criminal proceeding for purposes of the exclusionary rule
unreasonable.
The "in any criminal case" element has not been construed
to preclude an individual from asserting the privilege in a noncriminal proceeding as long as the evidence sought may be later
used in a criminal prosecution. As early as 1924, the Supreme
Court in McCarthy v. Arndstein64 asserted that:'65
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of
the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used.
It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the
answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who
gives it.
Again, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Kastigarv. United States6 '
reiterated the by now accepted doctrine: 7
It [5th amendment privilege] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.
[Footnotes omitted]
Accordingly, the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is available to a witness in a federal income tax
investigation. 66 The privilege is available even at the earliest
stages of such an investigation where the emphasis is on civil
liability. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in Mathis v.
United States,' wherein the Court held that Mirandawarnings
were required in a tax investigation where the person questioned
was in custody.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534-36 (1971).
Id.
266 U.S. 34 (1924).
Id. at 40.
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Id. at 444-45.
See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) and cases cited therein.
391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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It is true that a 'routine tax investigation' may be initiated
for the purpose of a civil action rather than criminal prosecution. . . . But tax investigations frequently lead to criminal
prosecutions, just as the one here did.7 0
The contrary view, expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Roundtree'7' is clearly erroneous. In
Roundtree, the primary contention of the taxpayer, against whom
the government was attempting to enforce an administrative
summons, was that he should have been allowed to depose the
investigating agents in order to support his charge that the summons was issued for the purpose of harassing him. The court
sustained the taxpayer's position on this count. The taxpayer
had, additionally, asserted his fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in refusing to comply with the
summons. As to this claim, the court stated:'
If the I.R.S. sustains its contention that this is a civil investigation, the mere fact that evidence might be used against Roundtree in a later prosecution will not support a claim of selfincrimination.
It is apparent from a reading of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Couch v. United States7 3 regarding I.R.S. summonses
and the fifth amendment privilege, that the Roundtree contention that the privilege against self-incrimination is not assertable
during the civil phase of an I.R.S. income tax investigation is
incorrect. The entire discussion in Couch, whether the intervening taxpayer could assert the privilege with respect to documents
which he owned but did not possess, would have been a meaningless exercise if the privilege was not assertable during the civil
stage of the investigation.
The fact that the privilege is assertable in a civil proceeding
does not mean that the court is bound by the witness' assertion
that the testimony or documents requested might incriminate
him. 7 1 Consequently, it has been held that a witness summoned
170. Id. at 4. The Mathis Court's application of the Miranda requirements to a
routine civil income tax investigation recognizes implicitly the right of a taxpayer to assert
his fifth amendment privilege at that stage of an investigation.
171. 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
172. Id. at 852.
173. 409 U.S. 322 (1972).
174. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969); accord,United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927).
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during the course of an income tax investigation must appear and
assert the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with
regard to specific questions asked or documents sought. 5 A blanket refusal to comply with an I.R.S. summons on the mere assertion that the summons is violative of the fifth amendment privi76
lege will not preclude enforcement.1
United States v. Malnik,177 a recent district court case, provide., insight into the extent to which a court will go in sustaining
a claim of privilege in a civil tax proceeding. In Malnik, the court
dismissed the government's petition to enforce an I.R.S. summons issued by a revenue agent. In so doing, the court sustained
the taxpayer's claim that the evidence sought might tend to incriminate him. What makes the case somewhat unusual is that
the taxpayer had already been acquitted of criminal charges for
alleged violations of § 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 71 for the same years that were the subject of the inquiry. The
six-year statute of limitations' 79 for criminal violations of the
Code had already run. The government argued that, under the
above stated circumstances, the taxpayer's claim of privilege
must fail. The court, however, disagreed and reasoned that the
privilege was still available because the government could still
bring additional charges against the taxpayer for the same
years.'80 The court's reluctance in Malnik to forego the protections
of the privilege where there remained a possibility of criminal
prosecution, even though remote, is indicative of the liberal construction given to the "in a criminal case" element of the privi8
lege.1 '
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 30 AFTR 2d 72-5278 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
178. 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1):
Any person who(1) Declaration under penalties of perjury.-Wilfully makes and subscribes
any return, statement, or other document which contains or is verified by a
written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he
does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter...
179. 26 U.S.C. §6531.
180. The court noted that it is possible that the taxpayer may have made false
statements and representations during the many conferences at the I.R.S in connection
with the original §7206 (1) prosecution, and, if so, it is possible that such statements were
made within the last six years subjecting the taxpayer to new charges under §7201 as to
attempt to evade taxes by making false statements. Additionally, the court noted the
taxpayer may be subjected to charges of perjury for having falsely testified in previous
criminal proceedings.
181. But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) where the Supreme Court upheld
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"Compulsion"
The second element of the privilege to be discussed is "compulsion." The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be
compelled" to incriminate himself. That compulsion is an essential ingredient of the privilege can be readily understood by looking at some of the underlying policies for the privilege.
It [the privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisatorial system of criminal justice; our fear that selfincriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual along until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load," ..
2..,
Compulsion can be of a physical or psychological nature,'8 3
or it can be by judicial process. ' The landmark case of Boyd v.
United States15 recognized the latter proposition. In that case,
the Supreme Court held that the fifth section of the act of June
22, 1874 which authorized the courts of the United States, in noncriminal revenue cases, to require the defendant or claimant to
produce in court his business books, invoices or papers to be
unconstitutional as applied to suits for penalties or to establish a
forfeiture of the party's goods. The court order in Boyd requiring
the claimant in a forfeiture proceeding concerning thirty-five cans
of plate glass to produce a certain invoice in court pursuant to the
above mentioned statute was thus deemed an unconstitutional
exercise of authority.
The Court in Boyd considered the subpeona requiring the
production of private books and records to be a form of search and
seizure and, hence, sufficiently compulsive in terms of the privilege. As to its conclusion that the subpeona was a form of search
the constitutionality of a California statute which required motorists involved in traffic
accidents to stop and give their names and addresses. The Court, in balancing the public
policy goals of the statute with an individual's privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, found the possibilty of self-incrimination insubstantial. See note 199 infra.
182. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
183. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
184. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
185. Id.
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and seizure, the Boyd Court stated:8

6

Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of
the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose.
The Court further concluded that the fourth amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
fifth amendment protection against compulsory self187
incrimination were interrelated. The Court in Boyd noted that:
[T]he unreasonable searches and seizures condemned in
the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose
of compelling a man in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself, which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In determining that the claimant was protected under the
privilege from producing the subpeoned invoice, the Boyd Court
reasoned that the governmental seizure, by means of a subpeona,
of a person's private books and papers to be used as evidence
against that person was the equivalent of compelling that person
to be a witness against himself. Thus, the Court concluded that:'88
a compulsory production of the private books and papers
of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is
compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the
equivalent of a search and seizure-and an unreasonable search
and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Boyd conclusion that legal process is a form of compulsion sufficient to invoke the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination has been consistently followed.8 9 In this regard, it
is well established that a taxpayer may object to the enforcement
of an I.R.S. summons requiring her to testify or produce her books
and records on the grounds that forced compliance would violate
186. Id. at 635.
187. Id. at 633.
188. Id. at 634-35.
189. SeeCouch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1973); Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440, 445 (1964); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911); and Bollman v.
Fagan, 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906).
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her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."' It is important, at this point, to note that a taxpayer who voluntarily complies with an I.R.S. summons will be unable at a later time to
assert his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with
regard to the'evidence voluntarily relinquished by him.','
"To Be A Witness"
The third element of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is that which provides that the person shall not be
compelled "to be a witness" against himself. Only governmental
compulsion aimed at forcing an individual to testify against himself is prohibited under the privilege. It is well established that
in terms of the scope of the phrase, "to be a witness," the specific
2
wording is not determinative.
The conclusions reached in Boyd, that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers is substantially the same as compelling
him to be a witness against himself, and that such a seizure would
be violative of both the fifth amendment privilege and the fourth
amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, were broadly interpreted in later cases'93 as prohibiting
governmental seizures of any evidence with respect to which the
individual had a superior property right. Under this interpretation of Boyd, the kind of evidence seized was irrelevant for purposes of the privilege.
Other cases, however, have held that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination did not protect the giving of evidence in certain forms. In Holt v. United States,'94 the Supreme
Court held that the privilege was not available to a defendant
who had been compelled to model a blouse to see if it fit.
Although it was clear that by trying on the blouse the defendant was supplying his accussors with evidence that was incriminating to him, Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the
190. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) and cases cited therein.
191. For a discussion of waiver with respect to the privilege against compulsory self.
incrimination, see United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); and Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See also 8 J. WIMoIIE,
EvifENCF §2276 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 161).
192. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.6 (1966); and Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584-85 (1892). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2252 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
193. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
194. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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Court, stated that defendant's claim of the privilege was based
upon "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment."' 5
The great jurist reasoned that:9 '
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man . . . to be [a] witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and
compare his features with a photograph in proof.
The rationale expressed in Holt was followed in a number of
cases under a variety of factual circumstances.197 However, it was
not until 1966 that the Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. State of
California,9 ' attempted to enunciate a definitive standard as to
what kinds of evidence would fall within the protection of the
privilege. The Supreme Court in Schmerber delineated the presently accepted rule that ". . . the privilege protects an accused
only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
"199 [Emphasis added, footnote
communicative nature ...
omitted]. In Schmerber, the petitioner, while in a hospital and
being treated for injuries which he sustained in an automobile
accident, was arrested and charged with the criminal offense of
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A physician at
the hospital, at the direction of a police officer and over the objection of the petitioner, took a blood sample from the petitioner.
The blood sample analysis report was later introduced into evidence at the petitioner's trial over his objections.
Among other things,20 0 the petitioner contended that the
withdrawal of blood and the admission of the resulting report into
evidence violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The
195. Id. at 252.
196. Id. at 252-53.
197. See cases collected in 8 J. WICtMORE, EVIDENCE §2265 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
198. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
199. Id. at 761. See the incredible alternative holding by the majority in California
v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) that giving your name and address after an automobile
accident is not testimonial and communicative. The five member majority in Byers with
respect to the main holding dissolved on this alternative holding. See note 181 supra.
200. The petitioner also alleged that the withdrawal of blood and the admission of
the analysis into evidence denied him due process of law under the fourteenth amendment, his right to counsel under the sixth amendment, and his right not to be subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment.
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Court, in denying the petitioner's claim, held that, though the
taking of blood was compelled, the privilege was not violated
because the evidence extorted was not of a testimonial or communicative nature. The Court in Schmerber specifically recognized
that the papers sought in the Boyd case would be protected under
the testimonial or communicative standard."0 ' However, it is clear
that the Schmerber decision stood in contradiction to the property right interpretation of the Boyd case which considered the
nature of the evidence seized irrelevant for purposes of the privilege.
Following Schmerber, the Supreme Court in Warden v.
Hayden'12 directly overruled the "mere evidence" rule which
evolved from the property right interpretation of the Boyd case.
The "mere evidence" rule established in Gouled v. United
States"' limited the evidence which the government could validly search for and seize to things which were either the "instrumentality" or "fruits" of a crime. The Warden Court allowed
articles of clothing seized from the defendant's home, pursuant
to a search warrant, to be used in evidence against him. The
Court reasoned that, since the articles of clothing were not testimonial or communicative, the defendant did not have a fifth
amendment privilege with respect to their seizure. Consequently,
the Boyd conclusion that a seizure of evidence protected by the
fifth amendment is necessarily "unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment was inapplicable.
The expansion of the permissible use of search warrants to
seize evidence of a crime by the Warden Court has recently led
to the question of whether the I.R.S. can use a search warrant to
obtain books and records from a taxpayer. The question was answered affirmatively by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
0 4 wherein the I.R.S.'s use of a
in United States v. Blank"
search
warrant to seize gambling records kept by a taxpayer was sustained.
The Blank court reasoned that the privilege does not attach
to the taxpayer whose records are seized by means of a search
201. The Court in Schmerber stated:
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which
are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce
one's papers. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616. [384 U.S. at 763-64].
202. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
203. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
204. 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1972).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/6

40

et al.: Part II: Student Comment: Use of the Summons, Intervention and Co

Tax Symposium-Part II
warrant because the warrant does not compel the taxpayer to
testify against himself. The individual, it was argued, becomes a
passive observer when a search warrant is used and is not an
active participant in the production of the incriminating evidence. In rejecting the taxpayer's fifth amendment challenge, the
0 5
court in Blank stated:
We believe that there is a valid and important distinction
between records sought by subpeona and records sought by
search warrant. The subpeona compels the person receiving it
by his own response to identify the documents delivered as the
ones described in the subpeona. The search warrant involves no
such element of compulsion upon an actual or potential defendant.
Blank additionally determined that the records seized were
not protectable under the privilege.0 ' It is clear that the Blank
holding as to the protectability of the records seized is erroneous. 27 The distinction drawn by the Blank court between records sought by subpeona and records sought by search warrant
is meaningless if the records themselves are considered testimonial and communicative. If the records seized pursuant to a
search warrant are deemed to be the testimony of the person from
whom they are seized, then the requirement that the person be
compelled to testify is met despite the fact that the person was
not required to implicitly identify those records by an act of production.
2
The Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California11
directly contradicts the proposition advanced in Blank that there
is no compulsion in terms of the privilege where the evidence is
seized by the government without the active participation of the
person raising the privilege. Although Schmerber ultimately decided that the seizure of the petitioner's blood did not violate his
205. Id. at 385.
206. Id. at 386-87.
207. See note 201 supra. The papers seized in Boyd were business records. See also
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973) where the Court stated:
[Petitioner] would hold here that the business records which petitioner actually owned would be protected in the hands of her accountant . . ..
[Emphasis added].
Although the Court in Couch denied petitioner her privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, it was because the business records were in the possession of her accountant, and not because they were business records. See also Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31
AFTR 2d 73-1075, 73-1081 (9th Cir. 1973).
208. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, it rested its decision on the basis that the blood was not itself "testimonial or
communicative" and not on the grounds that there was no compulsion °involved
in the seizure. In fact, the Court in Schmerber
stated:2 g
It could not be denied that in requiring petitioner to submit
to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the State
compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence
that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense ...
The officer's direction to the physician to administer the test
over petitioner's objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of the privilege. [Emphasis added]
Once it has been acknowledged that the records seized are
testimonial and communicative, the Supreme Court decision in
Warden v. Hayden210 is not controlling. The Court in Warden, in
upholding the governmental seizure pursuant to a search warrant
of articles of clothing belonging to the defendant first determined
that the articles of clothing were not protectable under the testimonial and communicative standard. The Warden Court specifically indicated that it had not considered the question of whether
a search warrant could be used to seize evidence which is protected by the privilege.
Contrary to the decision rendered by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Blank, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have held that the use of a search warrant by the
I.R.S. to obtain a taxpayers books and records violates that taxpayer's fifth .amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.
In Hill v. Philpott,21 I decided prior to the Blank case, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the taxpayer's claim
that the seizure of his income tax books and records by the Internal Revenue agents, pursuant to a search warrant, violated his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. After pointing
out that the government had acknowledged that the records
seized would have been protected by the privilege had their production been sought by summons, the court stated that "[the]
distinction between obtaining papers from a defendant by search
and seizure rather than by force of process is more shadow than
209. 384 U.S. at 761.
210. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
211. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/6

42

et al.: Part II: Student Comment: Use of the Summons, Intervention and Co

Tax Symposium-Part II
substance.

' 2'2

The court concluded that the protection against

compulsory self-incrimination afforded by the fifth amendment
would be seriously jeopardized if "the government could avoid all
Fifth Amendment considerations by merely obtaining a search
warrant.' '213
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Vonder Ahe
v. Howland2 1 recently reversed a district court decision that a
taxpayer's books and records could be properly seized pursuant
to a search warrant. The court of appeals, in deciding that the
taxpayer's records were protected from seizure under the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, agreed
with the position taken in Hill that there is no difference between
a summons and a search warrant in terms of the compulsion
required to invoke the privilege. With reference to this, the court
21 5
in Vonder Ahe stated:

One need ask only what would happen if the addressee of a
warrant refused to allow the search to be conducted to appreciate the magnitude of compulsion produced by a search warrant. Without the slightest hesitation his doors would be broken
down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired material
would be seized. How the imminence of such force can be considered as anything other than compulsion escapes us.
The court of appeals in Vonder Ahe further reasserted what had
been denied in Blank: that a taxpayer's books and records are
testimonial and communicative and, therefore, protected by
the
26
taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
It is clear that neither the Supreme Court decision in
Schmerber nor the Supreme Court decision in Warden overruled
the Boyd holding that the seizure of a person's personal books and
records violated his protections under the fourth and fifth amendments. The limitation placed on the availability of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination in Schmerber and the corresponding expansion of the legitimate usages of the search warrant in Warden cannot be read to authorize the use of search
warrants to seize a taxpayer's records. In this respect, the court
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

445 F.2d at 149.
Id.
31 AFTR 2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 73-1079.
Id. at 73-1081-82.
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of appeals, in Vonder Ahe was correct in following Hill rather
than Blank.1 7
"Against Himself"
The final element of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness "against himself." The "against himself" element, read in
the context of the entire privilege, dictates that the person asserting the privilege must be both the object of the compulsion to
testify and the one likely to be incriminated by the testimony.
Hence, the person against whom the governmental compulsion is
directed cannot assert the privilege if the evidence sought from
him would tend to incriminate someone other than himself,21 and
the person likely to be incriminated by the evidence cannot raise
the privilege unless he was also the person from whom the evidence was compelled. 2 9 These limitations on the availability of
the privilege have resulted in the characterization of the privilege
220
as a "personal" privilege.
The courts have had considerable difficulty in applying the
rule that the person asserting the privilege must be the person
against whom the governmental compulsion is directed. The difficulty has centered around the question of just who is the person
who is being compelled to testify in cases where the testimony
sought by the government is in the form of documents and records. Three distinct approaches to governmental compulsion can
be discerned from the decisions of the Supreme Court.
217. Contra, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Search Warrants to Obtain
Tax Records, 6 GA. L. REV. 399 (1972) where the author agreed, prior to the reversal by
the Ninth Circuit, with the holding of the district court in Vonder Ahe.
218. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); Hale v. Henkel; 201 U.S. 43,
69-70 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 609 (1896).
219. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
220. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) wherein the Court states:

It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal
privilege: it adhers basically to the person, not to information that may
incriminate him. [409 U.S. at 328]

The characterization of the privilege as a "personal" privilege has in turn resulted in the
recognition that the privilege protects the privacy of the individual. The Court in Couch
also stated:

By its very nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-condemnation. [409 U.S. at 327]

A third derivative from the characterization of the privilege as a "personal" privilege is
that it is only available to natural persons and not to entities. United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
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The first approach defines governmental compulsion in
terms of the physical production of the evidence. Under this approach, the governmental compulsion is only directed against the
person required to produce the evidence. The classic statement
supporting a "production" view of governmental compulsion was
made by Mr. Justice Holmes in Johnson v. United States: "A
party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its
production. 2' 2 ' Hence, under a "production" approach, where the
government seeks to obtain documentary evidence by means of a
summons or subpeona only the person required by the summons
2
or subpeona to produce the evidence can assert the privilege. 22
The second approach to governmental compulsion is based
on the idea that one of the purposes of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is to protect the privacy of the individual from state intrusion.22 3 The idea that the privilege has a privacy component derives from the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Boyd224 that the fourth and fifth amendment
protect against "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
[against him]. ' 12 2 [Emphasis added]. The Court in Boyd, emphasized that it was the taking of a person's private books and
taken or from whom
papers, not the manner in which they were 226
they were taken that offended the privilege:
[WIe have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself.
Under a privacy approach, a person is the object of governmental compulsion if he has a legitimate "expectation of privacy"
with respect to the evidence sought. In determining whether the
person asserting the privilege has the requisite "expectation of
221. 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
222. Possession has become a prerequisite to asserting the privilege because summonses are issued to the person in possession of the evidence so that the person in possession
is being compelled and is the person who must assert the privilege. Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
223. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) where the Supreme Court
noted that one of the policies of the fifth amendment was "to respect the inviolability of
the human personality." See also note 220 supra.
224. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
225. Id. at 630.
226. Id. at 633.
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privacy," both the nature of the evidence sought and the person
from whom the evidence is sought must be considered. Unlike the
"production" approach to governmental compulsion, the privacy
approach does not require that the asserter of the privilege be the
person required to produce the evidence.
The third approach to governmental compulsion is based on
property right considerations. The "property" approach derives
from substantially the same language in Boyd that the "privacy"
approach developed.2 2 Under the "property" approach, it is the
owner of the evidence sought who is the object of the governmen2
tal compulsion. 2
The three approaches to governmental compulsion were most
recently considered by the Supreme Court in Couch v. United
States2 1 wherein an I.R.S. summons was issued to the taxpayer's
accountant ordering him to produce: "'All books, records, bank
statements, cancelled checks, deposit tickets copies, workpapers
and all other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability

of the above taxpayer.'

230

The books and records sought were owned by the taxpayer
and had been given to her accountant for his use in preparing her
income tax returns and to be retained for possible future investigations. Upon the accountant's refusal to comply with the summons, afi enforcemeni proceeding was initiated by the government in the district court. The taxpayer intervened 231 and asserted that enforcement of the summons would violate her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Thus, the question
presented to the Court was whether the taxpayer could successfully assert her fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination in order to prevent the production of documents owned by her, but in the possession of her accountant. 22
The Supreme Court, with Justice Powell writing for the
majority in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, rejected the taxpayer's claim of a fifth amendment privilege. The Court, with two Justices dissenting, held that
227. See text accompanying notes 224-25 supra.
228. United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Egenberg,
443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Post, 72-2 USTC 9626 (E.D. Ky. 1972);
United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
229. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
230. Id. at 323.
231. Id. at 326-27. The Court acknowledged Donaldson'srequirement that one prerequisite to intervention is ownership of the records being sought.
232. 409 U.S. at 327.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/6

46

et al.: Part II: Student Comment: Use of the Summons, Intervention and Co

Tax Symposium-Part II
there was no compulsion against the taxpayer because the records
summoned were not in her possession and because she did not
have a legitimate "expectation of privacy" with respect to the
records summoned.
The Court, in the first part of its decision, rejected the taxpayer's argument that the owner of records and documents summoned is the person against whom governmental compulsion is
directed.2 33 In rejecting the taxpayer's contentions, the Court
emphasized that possession rather than ownership "bears the
closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the
Fifth Amendment." 234 Justice Powell, in reaching this conclusion,
apparently adopted the "production" analysis of governmental
compulsion: that is that governmental compulsion is directed
2 35
only at the person who is required to produce the evidence.
Since the petitioner in Couch was not compelled to produce the
records, she could not, simply, by virtue of her ownership of the
records, thwart their production by asserting her privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination.
The Court, in rejecting the "property" approach to governmental compulsion, felt constrained to address the Boyd holding
that the fifth amendment prohibited "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers"2 3 [Emphasis added] to be used as evidence against him
in a criminal proceeding. The Court concluded that the Boyd case
was distinguishable from the present case in that in Boyd ownership and possession of the subpeoned documents were conjoined.
According to Justice Powell, the key factor in the Boyd decision
was that the petitioner would have been the person required to
23 7
"produce and authenticate" the documents subpeoned.
The Court's rejection of the "property" approach to governmental compulsion is not a radical departure from recent Supreme Court thinking in the area of fourth and fifth amendment
rights. The Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. State of
California23 that only "testimonial and communicative" evidence is protected under the privilege had long signified the demise of property considerations in this area.23 Warden v.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

409 U.S. at 328-33.
Id. at 331. But see note 542 infra.
Id. at 328, 330.
Id. at 330 quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
409 U.S. at 330.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 200-04 supra.
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Hayden,24" decided a year after Schmerber, in overruling the
"mere evidence" rule, destroyed any remaining notions that individual property rights could bar governmental seizures of property. Hence, the decision in Couch that the taxpayer's proprietary
interest in the records sought was not in and of itself enough to
afford her the protections of the privilege is consistent with recent
Court rulings.
On the other hand, the majority's apparent adoption of the
narrow "production" approach to governmental compulsion may
lead to a substantial limitation on the scope of fifth amendment
protections. A strict adherence to the exclusionary aspects of the
"production" approach would deny the protection of the privilege
to any person not physically required to produce the evidence
sought. There are indications within the majority decision that
the Court does not intend to follow totally the "production" approach.
The most obvious indication that the Court does not intend
to adhere strictly to a "production" approach to governmental
compulsion is the second part of the Court's holding that the
petitioner had no legitimate "expectation of privacy" with respect to the records summoned. 24 ' The mere fact that the Court
considered the privacy question after having determined that the
petitioner was not required to produce the records, militates
against the notion that the Court totally accepted the "production" approach. The holding in Couch indicates that had the
petitioner been able to show a legitimate expectation of privacy
with respect to the records sought she would have been protected
under her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination from
their production.2 4 2 This would be true despite the fact that she
was not the person compelled to produce the records. The Court,
in indicating that a person's expectations of privacy with respect
to records not in his possession would support that person's claim
of the fifth amendment privilege, implicitly recognized the legitimacy of the "privacy" approach to governmental compulsion.
240. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
241. 409 U.S. at 335-36. The Court stated:
. . . but there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to
an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information
therein is required in an income tax return.
See, however, 409 U.S. at 338 for Douglas, J., dissenting.
242. See 409 U.S. at 345 n.2, Marshall, J. dissenting, where he indicates that he hopes
that his only difference with the majority is the decision on whether there was an expectation of privacy under the circumstances of the case.
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Another indication that the Court was reluctant to adopt a
strict "production" approach to governmental compulsion is the
Court's consideration of a "constructive possession" concept for
purposes of determining governmental compulsion. Mr. Justice
Powell stated:'
We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears
the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the individual
accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishmentof possession is
so temporary and insignificantas to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact. [Emphasis
added].
The constructive possession concept does not fit into the
framework of the "production" approach. Since the "production"
approach only recognizes the compulsion to produce the evidence, a person not in actual possession of the evidence sought is
not compelled for purposes of the fifth amendment privilege. To
say that a person can be constructively compelled to produce the
evidence is to contradict the very essence of a "production" approach.
The constructive possession concept is more easily explained
in terms of the privacy approach to governmental compulsion.
The Court in Couch cites two cases244 in which records were relinquished by the taxpayer for the purpose of custodial safekeeping
as examples of when the constructive possession concept may be
applicable. It is clear that in these cases and in cases where there
is a "mere fleeting divestment of possession," ' 5 the real governmental compulsion on the individual in constructive possession
of the evidence sought is the forced disclosure of information
which the individual legitimately expected to remain private.
Perhaps, the majority's curious citation to United States v.
Judson 211 as an example of a case where ownership and possession
conjoined, can also best be explained in terms of the Court's
implicit recognization of a "privacy" approach to governmental
compulsion. In Judson, the taxpayer's lawyer was directed pur243. 409 U.S. at 333.
244. United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1959) and Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956) were cited at 409 U.S. 322, 333-34, n.16.
245. 409 U.S. at 334.
246. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) cited at 409 U.S. 322, 330.
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suant to a subpeona duces tecum to produce records and documents owned by the taxpayer but in the lawyer's possession. The
Court in Judson held that the attorney could assert the taxpayer's
privilege against self-incrimination since the privilege could have
been asserted by the taxpayer if they had remained in the taxpayers possession. 2 7 Clearly, the reasoning employed by the
Court in Judson in inapposite to a strict "production" approach
to governmental compulsion. If the citation to Judson is not a
mistake, then the Court in Couch has indicated that a taxpayer's
records in the hands of his attorney are protected by the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination because
the taxpayer will be deemed to be in constructive possession of
his records.
The rationale furnished by the Judson court for the attorneyclient exception to the actual possession criteria is similar to the
constructive possession concept acknowledged
by the Couch ma48
jority. The court in Judson reasoned:
An attorney is his client's advocate. His function is to raise all
just and meritorious defenses his client has. No other "third
party," nor "agent," nor "representative" stands in such a
unique relationship between the accused and the judicial process as does his attorney. . . . The attorney and his client are
so identical with respect to the function of the evidence and to
the proceedings which call for its production that any distinction is mere sophistry. [Emphasis added]
As in a case of constructive possession, the personal compulsion
on the taxpayer whose records are sought from his attorney can
be more easily explained as breach of the taxpayer's expectation
of privacy than in terms of a "production" approach to governmental compulsion.
It would seem the effect that the Court's apparent adoption
of the narrow production approach to governmental compulsion
will have on the future of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination will be somewhat mollified by the Court's recognition of the legitimacy of the privacy approach to governmental
compulsion. On the other hand, the substantive holding in
Couch, that the taxpayer did not have a legitimate "expectation
of privacy" with respect to her records while they were in the
possession of her accountant, may indicate that the Court's recog247. See text accompanying notes 234-35 supra.
248. 322 F.2d at 467.
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